We show that 1 3 -absoluteness for Sacks forcing is equivalent to the nonexistence of a 1 2 Bernstein set. We also show that Sacks forcing is the weakest forcing notion among all of the preorders that add a new real with respect to 1 3 forcing absoluteness.
Introduction
Absoluteness is one of the central notions in set theory, which is the unchangingness of the truth-values of statements between two models of set theory. Forcing absoluteness is the absoluteness between ground models and their generic extensions, which plays an important role in many areas in set theory. In this paper, we focus on forcing absoluteness of projective statements (or statements in second-order arithmetic). (For the precise definition of this forcing absoluteness, see Definition 2.14.) Forcing absoluteness has close connections with regularity properties in descriptive set theory. For example, 1 3 statements are absolute between V and its generic extensions by Cohen forcing iff every 1 2 set of reals has the Baire property iff for any D real r there is a Cohen real over L [r ] . The same kind of equivalence holds for random forcing and Lebesgue measurability. 1 There is also a relation between forcing absoluteness for other forcings and these regularity properties for 1 2 sets of reals, e.g., 1 3 statements are absolute between V and its generic extensions by Hechler forcing iff every 1 2 set of reals has the Baire property iff for any real r , the set of all Cohen reals over L[r ] is comeager. There is also an analogue for amoeba forcing and Lebesgue measurability. 2 Sometimes, the regularity property for all 1 2 sets of reals is equivalent to that for all 1 2 sets of reals. The Ramsey property is a typical example and it is connected to forcing absoluteness for Mathias forcing: 1 3 statements are absolute between V and its generic extensions by Mathias forcing iff every 1 2 (or 1 2 ) set of reals has the Ramsey property iff for any real r , there is a Ramsey real over L[r ] (or the set of all reals Ramsey over L[r ] is co-Ramsey). 3 In this paper, we show that Sacks forcing is this kind of forcing. As a corollary, we see that Sacks forcing is the weakest forcing notion among all of the preorders that add a new real with respect to 1 3 forcing absoluteness. More precisely, Theorem 3.1 Let S be Sacks forcing.
The following are equivalent:
(a)
2. Suppose that P is a preorder which adds a new real (i.e. there is a P-generic filter G over V such that there is a real in V [G] but not in V ). Then 1 3 -P-absoluteness implies 1 3 -S-absoluteness. Note that the equivalence of (b), (c), and (d) of 1 in Theorem 3.1 was already proved by Brendle and Löwe [5] (Theorem 7.1, p. 1321).
Bernstein sets are typical counter examples for every regularity property. Hence, we could say that the property not being a Bernstein set is the weakest regularity property (for the definition of Bernstein sets, see Definition 2.3). There is a corresponding regularity property to not being a Bernstein set so-called Sacks measurability (for the definition, see Definition 2.5). In the proof of Theorem 3.4 (we will state later), we use Sacks measurability to prove forcing absoluteness rather than the non-existence of Bernstein sets.
It is a natural question whether these equivalences hold for higher level forcing absoluteness and the regularity properties for more complex projective classes. For the direction from forcing absoluteness to the regularity properties, several results have been established, e.g., if D is Hechler forcing and 1 4 -D-absoluteness holds, then every 1 3 set of reals has the Baire property. Furthermore, for any n ≥ 4, if 1 n+1 -D-absoluteness and 1 n+1 -D * D-correctness hold, then every 1 n set of reals has the Baire property. Here, forcing correctness is a slightly stronger condition than forcing absoluteness (for the definition, see Definition 2.14). There is also an analogue for amoeba forcing and Lebesgue measurability and there are some partial results for Mathias forcing and the Ramsey property. 4 (This generalization does not work for Cohen forcing and the Baire property and for random forcing and Lebesgue measurability. 5 
)
However, it is still open whether these regularity properties follow from only forcing absoluteness for arbitrary projective classes. We will show that this is the case for Sacks forcing: Theorem 3.3 Let n be a natural number with n ≥ 1. If 1 n+1 -S-absoluteness holds, then there is no 1 n Bernstein set.
We do not know if we can replace 1 n by 1 n above. For the reverse direction (from the regularity properties to forcing absoluteness), there is a little known as negative results with only assuming ZFC. For example, the Baire property for every projective set does not imply 1 4 forcing absoluteness for Hechler forcing because the consistency strength of the former statement is just ZFC (7.17 Conclusion (p. 43) in Shelah [17] ) but that of the latter is inaccessible (Theorem 9.5.6 (p. 477) in Bartoszyński and Judah [2] ). For the same reason, the Ramsey property for every 1 3 set of reals does not imply 1 4 forcing absoluteness for Mathias forcing (Theorem 5.2 (p. 188) in Halbeisen and Judah [7] ).
But, if we assume the uniformization property for suitable projective classes, we can get positive results: e.g., if n ≥ 1, 1 2n−1 has the uniformization property and every 1 2n set of reals has the Baire property, then 1 2n+1 forcing absoluteness for Cohen forcing holds. 6 (For the definition of the uniformization property, see Definition 2.20.) Here we only assume the uniformization property for odd level projective classes because 1 2 does not have the uniformization property and these assumptions are true under suitable large cardinals assumptions or projective determinacy. (For the details, see Remark 2.22, Theorem 2.23, and Theorem 2.24.)
We will prove that this is also true for Sacks forcing: 4 Lebesgue measurability for all 1 3 sets of reals from 1 4 absoluteness for amoeba forcing was proved by Brendle [3] . For the proofs for Lebesgue measurability and the Baire property, see Theorem 9.5.5, Theorem 9.5.6 (p. 476-477) and Theorem 9.6.3 (p. 479) in Bartoszyński and Judah [2] . For the Ramsey property, see Theorem 5.3 (p. 189), Corollary 6.1 (p. 191), and Corollary 6.5 (p.192) in Halbeisen and Judah [7] . 5 More precisely, it is consistent with ZFC that every projective statement is absolute between V and its generic extensions by Cohen forcing but there is a 1 2 set of reals without the Baire property. The same holds for random forcing and Lebesgue measurability. 6 The same holds for random forcing and Lebesgue measurability. For the proofs, see Lemma 2 (p. 367) in Woodin [20] . Theorem 3.4 Let n be a natural number with n ≥ 1. Assume that 1 2n−1 has the uniformization property. If there is no 1 2n Bernstein set, then 1 2n+1 -S-absoluteness holds.
This paper consists of three sections. In the second section we will look at the basic concepts and the facts for our results. In the last section we will prove our results.
Basic concepts and facts
From now on, we will work in ZFC. We assume that readers are familiar with the elementary theories of forcing and descriptive set theory. (For basic definitions we will not mention, see Jech [8] and Moschovakis [15] .) Also when we call something a real, it is an element of Cantor space ω 2. (Usually, we mean an element of Baire space ω ω by a real. But for simplicity, we will work on Cantor space and there are no essential differences in the following arguments.) 
4. When there are at least two nodes in T which are incompatible, let stem(T ) denote the maximal node t 0 of T such that for any node t of T , either t 0 ⊆ t or t ⊆ t 0 holds. [5] .
Note that typical regularity properties can be expressed in the analogous way to the definition of Sacks measurability as follows: We will refer to the following fact, which is a part of Theorem 3. Let us review the definition and the basic properties of Sacks forcing: Definition 2.9 (Sacks forcing) Sacks forcing S is defined in the following way:
Then, by the genericity of G, s is a real. Such a real is called a Sacks real over V .
On the other hand, G is reconstructed from s and V because
Therefore, there is a canonical correspondence between Sacks reals over V and S-generic filters over V . From now on, we identify Sacks reals over V with S-generic filters over V in the above way.
The following property is known as the minimality of Sacks forcing: Theorem 2.11 (Sacks [16] ) Suppose that s is a Sacks real over V . Then, in V [s], for any set X such that X is not in V and
Proof The proof can be found in Lemma 28 (p. 18) in Geschke and Quickert [6] .
We will need the following further properties of Sacks forcing: Theorem 2.12 (Sacks [16] ) Suppose that s is a Sacks real over V . Then, in V [s], every real s which is not in V is also a Sacks real over V .
Proof The proof can be found in Lemma 27 and the discussion after it (p. [16] [17] in Geschke and Quickert [6] . Now we come to the forcing absoluteness which is the main subject of this paper: Definition 2.14 (Forcing absoluteness) Let n be a natural number with n ≥ 1, P be a preorder, and be 1 n or 1 n . 1. By -P-absoluteness, we mean the following statement:
If G is a P-generic filter over V , then for any -formula φ and any real x in V ,
2. By -P-correctness, we mean the following statement: If G is a P-generic filter over V , then for any -formula φ and any real x in V [G],
Remark 2.15
Let n be a natural number with n ≥ 1 and P be a preorder.
1.
1 n -P-absoluteness is equivalent to 1 n -P-absoluteness. The same holds for forcing correctness.
2.
1 n -P-correctness implies 1 n -P-absoluteness.
The following remark shows us why we need only forcing absoluteness for Sacks forcing to prove the non-existence of Bernstein sets:
Remark 2.16
Let n be a natural number with n ≥ 1. By the minimality of Sacks forcing, 1 n -S-correctness is equivalent to 1 n -S-absoluteness. The following result is a basic tool in descriptive set theory, called "Shoenfield absoluteness": Theorem 2.17 (Shoenfield [18] ) Suppose M is a transitive model of ZF+DC containing ω V 1 . Then every 1 2 -formula is absolute between M and V .
Proof The proof can be found in Theorem 25.20 (p. 490) in Jech [8] .
Remark 2.18 By Theorem 2.17, we have 1 2 -P-correctness for any preorder P.
In the proof of Shoenfield absoluteness, he constructed an absolute tree called "Shoenfield tree" for each 1 2 statement, which itself is important in descriptive set theory: Theorem 2.19 (Shoenfield [18] ) For any real a and a 1 2 (a) set P, there is a tree
Now we introduce the uniformization property for proving Theorem 3.4:
Definition 2.20 (Uniformization) Let be a subset of P( ω 2 × ω 2). Then has the uniformization property if for any relation P in , there is a function f from ω 2 into itself in (as a graph) such that f ⊆ P (as a graph) and the domain of f is the same as that of P.
This definition allows us to replace relations by functions while keeping the complexity of sets, which is often useful in descriptive set theory.
The following is a classical result on the uniformization property: Proof The proof can be found in 4E.4 (p. 235) in Moschovakis [15] .
Remark 2.22
Let be a projective pointclass. If has the uniformization property, then the dual class of (i.e. the set of complements of sets in ) does not have the uniformization property. In particular, 1 1 and 1 2 do not have the uniformization property as we mentioned in Sect. 1.
The following results are the justification of our assumption on the uniformization property in Theorem 3.4: Theorem 2.23 (Moschovakis [14] ) Suppose that projective determinacy holds. Then for any natural number n with n ≥ 1, 1 2n−1 and 1 2n have the uniformization property.
Proof For the proof, see 6C (p. 310-317) in Moschovakis [15] . [13] (Corollary, p. 91)) Suppose that there are infinitary many Woodin cardinals. Then projective determinacy holds. 
Theorem 2.24 (Martin and Steel

Proofs of theorems
Since the reals in L[r ] is a 1 2 (r ) set of reals, the above statement is equivalent to a 1 3 -formula with a parameter r . By 1 3 -P-absoluteness, it also holds in V . Hence we obtained (d).
Next, we show that (d) ⇒ (a). Suppose that 1 3 -S-absoluteness fails and we will derive a contradiction. Then there are a Sacks real s over V , a 1 3 -formula φ and a real r in V , such that φ(r ) is not absolute between V and V [s]. By Shoenfield absoluteness (Theorem 2.17), every 1 3 -formula is upward absolute. Hence
Let θ be the 1 1 α 2 , r ) . Then, there is a real s such that for any real y, θ(s , y, r y, θ(s , y, r ) . By the forcing theorem, there is an S such that
whereṡ is a canonical name for a Sacks real. Now we go back to V . Let P = {(x, y) | x ∈ [S] and ¬θ(x, y, r )}. Then dom(P) = [S] and P is a 1 1 (r, S) set of reals. By Theorem 2.19, we can take a Shoenfield tree T on 2 × 2 × ω 1 in L[r, S] such that P = p[T ].
The idea of proving forcing absoluteness is to approximate this P by a simple set (in this case, a closed set) with a perfect set domain so that we can lift ¬θ up to a generic extension of V by using Shoenfield absoluteness to contradict ( * ).
The following lemma, which is an analogue of 8G.1 in Moschovakis [15] due to Mansfield [12] , is essential for that purpose. Since the first statement is equivalent to a 1 1 -formula with parameters T , r and the second statement is equivalent to a 1 2 -formula with parameters S , T , by Shoenfield absoluteness, the above statements also hold in V [s ]. Since s is in [S ], V [s ] " ∃y ∈ ω 2 ¬θ(s , y, r )", which contradicts ( * ).
2. Suppose that P is a preorder which adds a new real. By (d) ⇒ (a) in (1), it suffices to show (d). But we can carry out exactly the same argument as in the proof of (a) ⇒ (d) by replacing S by P. Theorem 3.3 Let n be a natural number with n ≥ 1. If 1 n+1 -S-absoluteness holds, then there is no 1 n Bernstein set. Proof Take any 1 n set of reals P. We will show that P is not Bernstein, i.e. there exists a perfect tree S on 2 such that either [S] ∩ P = ∅ or [S] ⊆ P holds.
Take a 1 n -formula φ, a 1 n -formula ψ, and a real r such that
Note that ( * * ) is equivalent to a 1 n+1 -formula with a parameter r . Hence, by This is equivalent to a 1 n+1 -formula with a parameter r . Therefore, by 1 n+1 -Sabsoluteness, the above statement also holds in V .
Since Proof We will show that for any k ≤ 2n + 1, 1 k -S-absoluteness holds by induction on k. By Remark 2.18, we may assume k ≥ 3.
Suppose that 1 k -S-absoluteness fails and we will derive a contradiction. By exactly the same argument as in the proof of (d) ⇒ (a) in Theorem 3.1 with replacing Shoenfield absoluteness by 1 k−1 -S-absoluteness ensured by induction hypothesis, we will get a 1 k−2 -formula θ , an S ∈ S, and a real r such that The idea is the same as in the proof of (d) ⇒ (a) in Theorem 3.1. This time, we will approximate f by some continuous function whose domain is a perfect subset.
The following claim provides us a local approximation of f via simple sets where we use Sacks measurability instead of the non-existence of Bernstein sets. For that, we need that f is not just a relation but a function so the uniformization property played an essential role. Then, since f is a 1 2n−1 subset, P m is a 1 2n set of reals for each m ∈ 2. By Sacks measurability for every 1 2n set ensured by Remark 2.6, P m is Sacks measurable for each m ∈ 2. Hence we can find an S ≤ S such that [S ] ∩ P m = ∅ for each m ∈ 2.
Pick any element x 0 in [S ]. Then by the condition of S , x 0 is not in P m for each m ∈ 2, namely f (x 0 )(i) = m, which is absurd. Now we are going to amalgamate these local approximations to produce a continuous function with a perfect set domain which is a subset of f . By Claim 2, we can construct S t ∈ S | t ∈ <ω 2 and m(t) ∈ 2 | t ∈ <ω 2 such that
